II. SYSTEM MODEL Arguably, the most useful application of (keyless) secret message transmission is secret-key sharing as discussed in [8] , [9] and other related works, although there exist some fundamental differences between these two problems. Roughly speaking, in secret message transmission, the message is known to Alice before starting the transmission; while in secret-key sharing, the key (a secret message to be shared by Alice and Bob) can be established (and become known to Alice) after the transmission is completed.
I. INTRODUCTION
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Abstract-A secret-key sharing strategy based on layered broadcast coding is introduced for slow fading channels. In the model considered, Alice wants to share a key with Bob while keeping the key secret from a passive eavesdropper, Eve. Both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels are assumed to undergo slow fading, and perfect channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known only at the receivers during the transmission. Layered coding facilitates adapting the reliably decoded rate at Bob to the actual channel state without CSI available at Alice. The index of a reliably decoded layer is sent back to Alice via a public and error-free channel, which is exploited by Alice and Bob to generate the secret key. In this paper, the secrecy key rate is derived. In addition, the optimal power distribution over coded layers is characterized. It is shown that layered coding can increase the secrecy key rate significantly compared with single-level coding.
Wireless secrecy has attracted considerable research interest due to the concern that wireless communication is highly vulnerable to security attacks, particularly eavesdropping attacks. Much recent research was motivated by Wyner's wire-tap channel model [1] where the transmission between two legitimate users (Alice and Bob) is eavesdropped upon by Eve via a degraded channel. The secrecy level in this model is measured by the equivocation rate at Eve. Wyner showed that secret communication is possible without sharing a secret-key between legitimate users. Later, Csiszar and Korner generalized Wyner's model to consider general broadcast channels in [2] .
Interestingly, the wireless medium provides its own endowments that facilitate defending against eavesdropping. One such endowment is fading [3] , whose effects on secret transmission has been studied in [4] - [6] . In these works, assuming that all communicating parties have perfect channel state information (CSI) prior to transmission, the ergodic secrecy capacity has been derived. The ergodic scenario in which Alice has no CSI about Eve's channel (but knows the channel statistics) has also been studied in [4] . When Alice does not know any prior CSI (except channel statistics), but can receive l-bit of automatic repeat request (ARQ) feedback per channel coherence interval from Bob reliably, the throughput of several secure hybrid-ARQ protocols has been derived in [7] . In this section, we introduce a secret-key sharing scheme, in which Gaussian layered broadcast coding is used for the communication phase, and random secrecy binning is used for the key generation phase. Before presenting the scheme, we first introduce Gaussian layered broadcast coding.
A. Gaussian Layered Broadcast Coding
As an example, we consider the Alice-Bob channel given by (1) . First, let us assume there are L layers in a layered coding scheme. That is, the transmitted codeword is a superposition of L codewords, i.e., 
A. Channel Model
The Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve channels undergo block fading, in which the channel gains are constant within a block while varying independently from block to block [3] . We assume that each block is associated with a time slot of duration T and bandwidth W; that is, ni = l2W T J real symbols can be sent in each slot. We also assume that the number of channel uses within each slot (i.e., nl) is large enough to allow for the invocation of random coding arguments .
In drop the index m and denote h t as a random channel realization . We assume that it is a real random variables with a probability density function (PDF) f t and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi, for each t = 1,2.
Furthermore, we assume a short term power constraint (excluding power variation across time slots) such that the average power of the signal X m per slot has the constraint that E [llx m I1 2 ] ::::: nIP for every m. There exists an error-free feedback channel from Bob to Alice, through which Bob sends back k m for time slot m. The feedback channel is assumed to be public, and therefore k m is obtained by both Alice and Eve without any error.
B. Secret Key Sharing Protocol
The secret-key sharing protocol consists of two phases: a communication phase and a key-generation phase. as interference. Note that this predetermined ordering can be achieved because of the degraded nature of Gaussian SISa channels.
When a continuum of layers is used, the transmitter sends an infinite number of layers of coded information.
Each layer conveys a fractional rate, denoted by dR, whose value depends on the index of the layer. We refer to s, the realization of the fading power, as a continuous index. The incremental differential rate is given by2 
The total power over all layers is constrained by
B. Secret Key Sharing Based on Layered Coding
In this section, we discuss the key sharing scheme based on Gaussian layered coding.
1) Codebook Construction:
We need two types of codebooks, each of which is used for the communication or key-generation phase, respectively.
The codebook used for the communication phase consists of a continuum of coded layers represented by {C(2 n 1dR(s), nl)}, where ni is the codeword length and dR( s) is the (incremental differential) rate at layer s. The (sub-)codebook for each layer is generated randomly and independently. That is, for any codebook C (2 n 1dR(s The codebook used for the key generation phase is based on Wyner's secrecy coding [1] , [4] . By letting (10) Jo Jo 1 
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we first generate all binary sequences {B} of length n (R -E), where n == Mri«. The sequences {B} are then randomly and uniformly grouped into n.H; groups each with n(R -R; -E) sequences. Each secret key w E {I, ... , 2 n R s } is then randomly assigned to a group, denoted by B(w). Alice then looks up in the key-generation codebook for a w such that v E B (w ), and outputs w as the secret key generated. Note that all those messages are decoded by Bob, and therefore Bob can generate the same sequence v and the same key w as Alice does.
IV. SECRECY KEY RATE
In this section, we present the secrecy key rate achieved, and the optimal distribution of power over coded layers. Due to space limitations, we defer all proofs to an upcoming long version of this paper.
A. Layered-Coding Based Key Sharing
The following result characterizes the secrecy rate when the power distribution is given.
Theorem 1: For a given power distribution p(s) over layers indexed by s, the secrecy key rate of the layeredcoding based key sharing scheme is 2All logarithms are to the natural base, and thus rates are in terms of nats per second per Hertz. (12) 2764 canceling X~2J first, and treating the interference term x!.£d as noise). Furthermore, the second term can be written as
i': h2P(s)ds = log (1 + h 2 [1(h 2 ) -1(h l) ]) . (19)
Jh 2 
By noticing that 1(h 2) -1(ht} is the total power used for the layers X~I J n X!.£2 J, and 1(h l ) is the total power used for the layers x!.£d, (19) gives the rate of information that Eve can possibly deduce from X~I J n x!'£21 through her channel with power gain h 2 . An interesting finding here is that what the best Eve can do is to treat the interference term X!.£IJ as noise (as Bob docs), and therefore cannot benefit from the structure of interference either.
Due to the absence of CSI at the transmitter before the transmission , the layered broadcast coding strategy creates a medium with interference, where the undecodable layers play the role of self-interference. We remark here that this is a special case of secret communication over a medium with interference as discussed in [13] .
B. Single-Level-Coding Based Key Sharing
When single-level coding is used, self-interference does not occur. In this case, the following secrecy key rate can be achieved.
Lemma J: [12, Theorem 1] The secrecy key rate of a single-level-coding based scheme is given by
where R, is the rate of single-level coding.
Comparing with the layered-coding based scheme, the single-level-coding based approach has lower decoding complexity, and requires less feedback (only l-bit per time slot). However, it is sub-optimal in general. Also, a singlelevel coding scheme can be considered as a special case of a layered-coding scheme, in which all power is allocated to one layer. This again motivates us to find the power distribution for optimizing the layered-coding scheme.
(15) (14) (16) 
.(H l H 2) -fIII [ sp(s) -H2P(S) ] ds (13)
We discuss some insights from Theorem 1. First, except for the rare case in which H l is always smaller than H 2 , R; is positive. Note that this is impossible without feedback (one-way communication). Furthermore, R, can be written as integration by parts), we have an alternative form. where x~1 1 and x!'£1 1 denote the set of decodable and Lemma 2: The secrecy key rate given by (12) 
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A necessary condition for a maximum of the integral of
L(x , I(x) , I'(x)
) over x is a zero variation of the functional.
By solving the associated Euler-Lagrangian equation [14] given as
we have the following characterization for the optimal I( x) . Lemma Finally, we have the following secrecy key rate under the optimal power distribution.
Theorem 2: When the optimal power distribution is used, the following secrecy key rate is achieved,
where I( x) and (xo, Xl) are found from the condition given by (23). In this section, we assume Rayleigh fading for AliceBob and Alice-Eve channels. We consider a symmetric scenario in which both fading power gains (Hi and H 2 ) are exponentially distributed with unit means.
The secrecy rate with layered coding is computed by numerically evaluating Fig . 3 shows the optimal power distribution for coded layers. A clear trend is that more power is allocated to lower layers as the total power P becomes larger. In general, the optimal power distribution does not concentrate much on a certain layer (or a short interval), especially when P is large. Fig. 4 compares the secrecy key rates of layered coding and single-level coding based schemes (both optimized). The secrecy key rate of the layered-coding based scheme is significantly higher.
